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Abstract
The work of Kazantzakis is saturated with theological language, but 
disagreement continues as to how such language is to be understood. In 
some readings, Kazantzakis is interpreted as a non-religious, or even an­
ti-religious, writer who rejects or is skeptical towards belief in God; while 
other readings emphasize the deeply religious character of his writings, see­
ing in them a ‘post-Christian’ or postmodern development of traditional 
Christian concepts. Critics, however, have surprisingly neglected a promis­
ing proposal, which would bring to the fore Kazantzakis’s lifelong engage­
ment with Eastern religion. This proposal, although not denying that Ka­
zantzakis was influenced by many of the streams of thought identified by 
others (e.g., evolutionary theory, process philosophy, apophatic theology, 
etc.), holds that Kazantzakis’s most fundamental commitment lay with a 
monistic and idealist worldview, prominent in Eastern philosophy and reli­
gious thought, which conceives reality as a unified whole that is ultimately 
spiritual in nature.
“Be careful, avoid constructing the face o f our God 
from what you have learned o f the God of the Christians.”
— Kazantzakis, letter to Fr. Emmanuel Papastephanou
It has been observed that the modern Greek novelist Nikos Kazantza­
kis “uses the word ‘God’ more frequently, perhaps, than any other twenti-
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eth-century writer” (Dombrowski 1997:4).* Even a superficial acquaintance 
with Kazantzakis’s oeuvre makes it plain that what Laurence Hemming has 
said of Heidegger applies equally well to Kazantzakis—viz., that he ‘“reeks 
of God,’ and rarely in reading him is it possible to pass more than a few pag­
es without a mention of God, the gods or the divine” (2009:175). But just as 
commentators have struggled to make sense of Heidegger’s relation to reli­
gion, so with Kazantzakis a bewildering array of interpretations has arisen, 
many incompatible with one another. The problem, however, is not only 
the wide range of sometimes conflicting readings of Kazantzakis’s views on 
God and religion; even more problematic and puzzling is that, on the one 
hand, Kazantzakis talks incessantly and devoutly about God, and yet on the 
other hand he is often considered by both scholars and the reading public 
as a thoroughly non-religious, or even anti-religious, writer—and so he is 
variously categorized as a religious skeptic, an atheist, a non-theist of some 
sort, an anti-Christian, or at best a Christian of a highly unorthodox vari­
ety. My aim in this paper is, firstly, to make some sense of this multitude 
of readings, offering along the way indications as to where many of them 
fall short; and secondly, to propose an alternative reading that has been 
surprisingly overlooked in the large secondary literature, one that follows 
clues such as the opening quote above in aligning Kazantzakis’s thought 
with philosophical currents in Eastern religions such as Hinduism and Bud­
dhism rather than exclusively with the Abrahamic and especially Christian 
traditions.
Kazantzakis as atheist
It has been quite common, though perhaps less so nowadays, to read 
Kazantzakis as an atheist. The writer’s second wife, Helen Kazantzakis (née 
Samiou), has given a degree of credence to this view by referring to her 
husband and herself as “atheists” (1968:433).2 A similar reading has been 
advocated by another woman who was close to the novelist, Katerina Ang- 
helaki-Rooke, a godchild of Kazantzakis, with whom she exchanged letters 
as she grew up. In the introduction to a collection of Kazantzakis’s letters 
that she helped translate (with Philip Ramp), published as The Suffering God: 
Selected Letters to Galatea and to Papastephanou, she states: “If by spirituality 
we mean hoping for divine supervision over creation, reward, and the pres­
ervation of the personality after death, then Kazantzakis was not spiritual.
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But if we mean the thirst for an absolute answer to the ever-unanswered 
questions, then he was” (1979:17). She goes on to describe the (a)theologi- 
cal content of Kazantzakis’s most overtly philosophical work, Salvatores Dei: 
Askitiki (The Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises, first published in in 1927) in 
the following terms: “There is a God in The Saviors but there is no hope; there 
is a believer but no object of belief...Kazantzakis made his God from athe­
istic elements” (18; emphasis in the original). A little later she reiterates, in 
somewhat paradoxical language: “He [i.e., Kazantzakis’s God] is made in the 
image of man and is identical to man. Kazantzakis’ God does not believe 
in God.” For this reason, explains Anghelaki-Rooke, “when Kazantzakis 
says [in The Saviors], ‘Our duty is to transubstantiate matter into spirit,’ this 
transubstantiation has no relation to any return of man to God but signi­
fies man’s victory over a non-God.” In short, according to Anghelaki-Rooke, 
“The Saviors is not theology but a form of anthropology” (19).3
Andreas Poulakidas also reads Kazantzakis’s Spiritual Exercises as 
the expression of an essentially atheistic worldview. Addressing the infa­
mous ending of the book, where Kazantzakis discloses (what he calls) “this 
great, sublime, and terrifying secret: that even this One does not exist!” 
Poulakidas writes: “Ultimately, he [Kazantzakis] has no theology. If, in es­
sence, the One does not exist, then one certainly cannot speak of God, since 
there is no God, or nature, or man to be a God and to be saved. There is 
only the unlimited and deathly silent Abyss” (1975:217). In like fashion, 
Charles Glicksberg describes Kazantzakis as an atheist who propounded 
a ‘Dionysian’ (i.e., joyous and affirmative) form of nihilism. According to 
Glicksberg, “Kazantzakis is a fitting example of the secular saint. A reli­
gious atheist, he never gave up the quest for the innermost secret of life 
even after he became convinced that there was no ultimate meaning to 
be found” (1975:276).4 More recently, but again in a similar vein, Dimi­
tris Tsiovas characterizes Kazantzakis as “a writer of extremes vacillating 
between intellect and instinct: at the same time a reclusive writer and a 
man of action, Cretan patriot and cosmopolitan traveller, god-driven intel­
lectual and atheist” (2009:84; emphasis mine). Finally, Australian-based 
philosopher, Damon Young, in a short piece entitled “Faith Without God,” 
presents Kazantzakis as an atheist whose ultimate value is freedom. Again 
referencing the ending of Kazantzakis’s Saviors of God, Young explains that, 
for Kazantzakis, “what we are struggling for is the realisation that no God,
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nor ‘spirit of Man,’ grounds our brief mortal lives,” and he goes on to add 
that “In his [Kazantzakis’s] quest for the freedom of a godless, hopeless and 
yet brave cosmos, Kazantzakis retained his faith in one thing only: freedom 
itself... Kazantzakis’s faith was a faith in freedom itself” (Young 2006:69).
The atheistic interpretation of Kazantzakis has also been promulgated 
and perpetuated by a quite different and often hostile group: the Christian 
community, and specifically its evangelical and fundamentalist wings, both 
within the Orthodox Church and beyond. Opposition to Kazantzakis’s work 
within ecclesiastical and theological circles began very early on in his career. 
In May 1930, Kazantzakis and Demetrios Glinos (the editor of Anayennisi 
[Renaissance], the Athenian periodical in which Askitiki was originally pub­
lished) were summoned to appear in court “for sneering at religion.”5 In the 
latter years of Kazantzakis’s career, as his novels were attracting a wider 
audience and critical acclaim, sections of the church and media in Greece 
(and elsewhere, including the United States) reacted harshly, seeking to vil­
ify him as an atheist, communist, immoralist, and decadent (see Antonakes 
1996:26-27). In January 1954, the Vatican placed The Last Temptation on 
the Index of Forbidden Books, and in June of the same year the Holy Synod 
of the Church of Greece followed suit, contending that Kazantzakis’s novels 
undermine the teachings and scriptures of the church, and therefore advo­
cating that his books be banned.6 Even after Kazantzakis’s death in 1957, 
the conflict and controversy continued. Most famously, upon Kazantzakis’s 
death, the Archbishop of Athens (Theokletos) caved in to conservative de­
mands by not allowing Kazantzakis’s body to lie in state in any church in 
Athens. (The body was thereupon transferred to Crete, with the Archbishop 
of Crete giving permission for an abbreviated Orthodox funeral.) Later, the 
well-known iconographer Photios Kontoglou, in articles published in 1978 
in a Boston newspaper, described Kazantzakis’s work as containing “irreli- 
gion” and “blasphemies” (see Antonakes 1996:23). One cannot also fail to 
mention Martin Scorsese’s film adaptation of The Last Temptation, released 
in 1988 amid zealous protests from church groups who were scandalized by 
Kazantzakis’s account of the life of Christ. Such responses, no matter how 
rooted they might be in irresponsible ignorance and prejudice, have served 
to create and reinforce an image of Kazantzakis as an anti-Christian writer 
who wishes to do away with traditional faith, and perhaps also any religious 
belief at all.
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It is worthwhile, however, to place the atheistic perception of Kazant- 
zakis, as endorsed by theological groups as well as secular scholars, along­
side Kazantzakis’s own view of his works (which is not to say, of course, that 
his view necessarily is the correct or the best one). In a letter to his friend, 
Ioannis Konstantarakis, dated 6 June 1954, Kazantzakis stated:
My most recent work, The Poor Man o f God, Saint Francis, written last 
year, will begin to be printed in Eleftheria. Please follow it to see with what 
religious emotion it is written. And the priests accuse me o f  being an atheist! 
(2012b:766)
It is also pertinent to highlight, as others have done, that the response 
from religious groups, including the Orthodox Church, has never been 
uniform and in particular has never been entirely negative or condemna­
tory. The reception, rather, has always been mixed. Demetrios Constan- 
telos points out that “some of the leading Greek theologians of Kazantza­
kis’s era— for example, Nikolaos Louvaris— refused to condemn him as a 
blasphemer. Even less liberal Greek theologians like Vassilios Moustakis, 
although disagreeing with the terminology Kazantzakis used to describe 
churchmen and Christ, advised the Synod of the Orthodox Church of 
Greece to be cautious and avoid the mistake of excommunicating the fa­
mous author” (1996:50). Constantelos also draws attention to the fact that 
Kazantzakis was never excommunicated by the Orthodox Church, although 
it is difficult to see what ‘excommunication’ would amount to in the case of 
someone, like Kazantzakis, who held no official position in the church and 
did not participate in its liturgical and theological life. In any case, many in 
the Orthodox Church, including prominent bishops and theologians, have 
identified close correspondences between Kazantzakis’s writings and the 
spiritual and doctrinal heritage of Orthodoxy, even if they do not think of 
Kazantzakis as ‘Orthodox’ or even ‘Christian’ in any formal or traditional 
sense.7 What this suggests is that at least something in Kazantzakis’s works 
deeply resonates with a profoundly religious sensibility. To label or even 
dismiss Kazantzakis as an ‘atheist’ is to therefore run the risk of missing 
what is perhaps the central focus of his vision.8
Kazantzakis as 'post-Christian'
In order to bring to the fore the religious dimension of Kazantzakis’s 
work, while continuing to situate it within a broadly secular or at least
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non-Christian framework, scholars have discarded the limiting interpreta­
tive category of ‘atheism’ and have turned instead to a range of more fruit­
ful and theologically-informed perspectives. One of the most prominent 
voices in this discussion has been Peter Bien, translator of many of Kazant- 
zakis’s novels and a leading commentator on these works. Introducing a 
recent special journal issue dedicated to Kazantzakis, drawn from a 2007 
symposium celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Kazantzakis’s death, 
Bien sought to answer the question that was put to the symposiasts: why 
read Kazantzakis in the twenty-first century? (2010:1-6). Bien’s answer is 
that Kazantzakis remains relevant because the philosophical and religious 
problems he struggled with continue to bedevil us today, and because we 
stand to learn much from the way he responded to these problems. Bien 
states that, “in the Odyssey, Zorba, Christ Recrucified, The Last Temptation, 
and Saint Francis (but not, I would venture, in Kapetan Mihalis), he [i.e., Ka­
zantzakis] examines a central problem of current and future times: how to 
deal with failure, how to live as though immortal in a Darwinian modern 
world with no afterlife, and how to give eternal significance to a life that 
lacks any realistically eternal dimension” (2010:4). As the emphasis here 
on contingency and transience makes clear, Kazantzakis is committed, in 
Bien’s view, to a naturalistic view of reality, according to which all that exists 
is the natural world and its inhabitants, so that supernatural entities such 
as gods and ghosts are eliminated as non-existent. This is the position, as 
one of its leading philosophical proponents (David Armstrong) formulates 
it, “that nothing but Nature, the single, all-embracing spatio-temporal sys­
tem, exists” (1978:138). Bien thus describes Kazantzakis as a ‘romantic 
naturalist,’ and he explains that, “By naturalist here, I mean a person who 
believes that being and nature are identical, hence that everything super­
natural—including any teleological explanation of the ultimate purpose of 
being—must be rejected” (2007:xi).
Note, however, the qualifier romantic: this connotes (according to 
Bien) a “yearning for transcendence” and a “refusal to accept limitation,” as 
against the classical ideals of restraint and rationality (2007:xi). One might 
say, then, that it is Kazantzakis’s romanticism that infuses his naturalism 
with the distinct religiosity that marks nearly every page of his books. The 
conception of God that results is one that Bien calls ‘post-Christian’: al­
though indebted in significant ways to the Christian tradition within which
3 9 2
Culture
Kazantzakis was raised and educated, the supernatural superstructure of 
the Abrahamic faiths is replaced with a naturalist outlook informed by the 
evolutionary theory of Darwin and the philosophical vitalism of Bergson. 
The Bergsonian influence is particularly (and rightly) emphasized by Bien, 
who notes that Kazantzakis’s thinking about God was largely modeled on 
his former teacher’s concept of the ‘élan vital’—a pure energy or life-direct­
ing principle, forever surging upward toward novel expressions of creativ­
ity, postulated by Bergson as that which fundamentally accounts for the 
evolution of all living species. Led by the religious overtones of Bergson’s 
account of the vital impetus and the evolutionary path it creates, Kazantza­
kis does not hesitate to divinize these biological drives and processes. For 
Kazantzakis, as Bien explains, God just is Creative Evolution: “Seen monis­
tically, god is the entire evolutionary process: the primordial essence that first 
wills its own congealment into life and then wills the unmaking of that crea­
tive action” (1989:38, emphasis in the original).
Bien interprets Kazantzakis’s Odyssey and his major novels as incar­
nating in poetic and narrative form this Bergsonian view of God. Speaking of 
the Odyssey, for example, Bien holds that, “The epic attempts to portray the 
entire cosmic situation as the life force’s evolutionary journey through matter 
in a creative process that unmakes itself, transubstantiating matter into spir­
it” (1989:193). Odysseas’s view, in the epic, is that “god is not encountered at 
the end of life’s journey but is with us at all stages of that journey—indeed is 
the journey” (Bien 1989:199). In line with this, the Odyssey presents us with 
the idea that “the absolute is not the concluding abyss but the entire cycle 
bringing us repeatedly from one dark abyss to another across the luminous 
interval called life; it is, as always, the élan vital” (Bien 1989:199). Even in 
earlier works, such as the plays Comedy, Christ, and Nicephorus Phocas, Bien 
detects a pattern that was to become standard in Kazantzakis’s later work: 
the use of Christian concepts and symbols for the sake of ‘meta-Christian’ 
purposes. Nicephorus Phocas is therefore read as “a meta-Christian spectacle 
of how a God inherent in matter thrusts matter into the struggle to undo 
itself and thereby to produce Spirit” (2007:403; see also Bien 2007:411-420). 
Most importantly, belief in an afterlife is rejected, and death is viewed not 
in a Christian manner (as the gateway to eternity), but in meta-Christian or 
Bergsonian terms as “the overcoming of matter...the ultimate act willed by 
matter itself in its upward élan toward self-overcoming” (Bien 2007:418).
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Kazantzakis’s religious and philosophical development was by no 
means straightforward, progressing from childhood piety to the renuncia­
tion of faith (under the influence of scientific theory), the critique of science 
also, and the discovery of Bergson, even a brief reversion to traditional faith 
(including a stay on Mt Athos in 1914), before making (by 1922) a complete 
turnabout and subscribing to a form of communism (see Bien 2007: 394- 
397). Eventually, the outlook Kazantzakis was to adopt incorporated as­
pects of all these philosophies and ideologies, and what remained constant 
was the innovative way he folded Christian concepts within a naturalist and 
Bergsonian framework. This, at least, is Bien’s influential reading, which 
sees Kazantzakis as not entirely anti-Christian nor wholly Christian, but 
‘meta-Christian,’ someone who seeks to reconfigure traditional Christian 
concepts in creative and possibly heterodox ways.
Bien is correct to point to the ways in which Kazantzakis goes beyond 
the Christian faith, but it is questionable whether he is correct to impute 
the belief in naturalism to Kazantzakis. Other commentators, as will be 
seen in the following section, agree with Bien that Kazantzakis is not an 
outright atheist or a standard theist, but they prefer to read him as a ‘pa- 
nentheist,’ panentheism (literally, ‘all is in God’) being the view that God 
is immanent within all creation, while at the same time transcending the 
physical world. Bien seems to allow for this reading, as when he writes of 
Kazantzakis: “I would say that at no time in his mature life was he without 
some form of theistic (more accurately, panentheistic) belief: faith in an 
infinite force inherent in matter—that is, belief in transcendence-within- 
immanence” (2007:397). Bien, however, is careful to locate transcendence 
within immanence: the infinite or transcendent emerges from, and is de­
pendent upon, the finite and physical world. The reading I wish to propose 
reverses this schema, rendering the transcendent fundamental and all else 
derivative. But this will have to wait for the final section of this paper, and 
in the meantime I will turn to recent developments of the panentheist read­
ing of Kazantzakis.9
Kazantzakis as process theist
One of the leading varieties of panentheism in contemporary philoso­
phy of religion is “process theism,” and the process view has recently be­
come a prominent interpretive lens for gaining a richer appreciation of Ka-
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zantzakis’s ideas on God. The principal proponents of process philosophy 
and theology have been Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Charles 
Hartshorne (1897-2000), though forerunners include thinkers such as Teil­
hard de Chardin and Henri Bergson, who were greatly influenced by evolu­
tionary theory. In outline, process philosophy upholds a Heraclitean meta­
physics, where process or becoming is more ultimate than permanence or 
being. Thus, the categories of change, creativity, and temporality assume 
foundational status in process metaphysics, and being is seen as only an 
abstraction of becoming. On this view, the basic units of the world or the 
most concrete real entities are not substances or enduring individuals, but 
‘processes’ or momentary events that Whitehead called “actual entities... 
drops of experience, complex and interdependent” (1978:18).
When this metaphysics is taken in a theological direction, a way of 
thinking about God results that diverges significantly from traditional or 
classical theistic conceptions. Process theists, in particular, highlight the 
one-sided, ‘monopolar’ nature of classical theism, where God is in all re­
spects creator, active, infinite, eternal, necessary, independent, immutable, 
and impassible, and is in no respects created, passive, finite, temporal, con­
tingent, dependent, mutable, or passible. The assumption underlying this 
view is that these two poles or sets of metaphysical properties are mutually 
exclusive, or form an ‘invidious contrast.’ As Charles Hartshorne and Wil­
liam Reese explain what they call ‘the doctrine of the invidious nature of cat­
egorical contrasts,’ “One pole of each contrary is regarded as more excellent 
than the other, so that the supremely excellent being cannot be described 
by the other and inferior pole” (2000:2). Classical theism therefore inherits 
the long-standing philosophical prejudice of valuing being over becoming 
and assuming that perfection must be static or unchanging: any change can 
only be a move away from or a move towards perfection, in which case a 
perfect being (God) has no need to change.
Whitehead, Hartshorne, and other process theists jettison this view 
of God, replacing it with a ‘dipolar’ (or ‘neoclassical’) version of theism. 
Challenging the assumption that God can only exemplify one of the two at­
tributes in a pair of metaphysical contraries (such as necessary-contingent, 
timeless-temporal), process theists defend the principle of the non-invidi- 
ousness o f  metaphysical contraries (see Hartshorne 1970:268).10 According to 
this principle, contrasting metaphysical pairs are not related as superior to
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inferior; rather, each pole in such pairs has valuable and admirable elements 
as well as inferior and deficient aspects. Regarding the being-becoming con­
trast, for example, some forms of change or becoming are defective (e.g., 
when change entails a movement towards evil or immorality), but other 
manifestations of change can be regarded as good or superior (e.g., those 
which involve a loving and sensitive responsiveness to the sufferings of oth­
ers). Now, if metaphysical contraries can in this way be complementary and 
non-invidious, and if (following Anselm) God is conceived as an absolutely 
perfect being (or ‘the being than which none greater can be conceived’), 
then it follows that God must be understood not in monopolar terms but 
as dipolar, exemplifying the most admirable forms of both pairs of meta­
physical contrasts. In other words, all expressions of excellence must be 
ascribed to God, including those found on either side of a non-invidious 
contrast. This is why the classical (e.g., the Aristotelian and Thomistic) no­
tion of God as an ‘unmoved mover,’ where God lacks the capacity to change, 
to participate in the evolving universe he has created, and to be affected by 
the joys and sorrows of his creatures, strikes process theists as a religiously 
impoverished understanding of God, for it overlooks what is best and most 
valuable in temporality and contingency. In contrast to classical theism, 
therefore, Hartshorne (1997:6, 39) holds that “God is the most and best 
moved mover,” and Whitehead (1978:351) depicts God as “the great com­
panion—the fellow-sufferer who understands.”
Darren Middleton and Daniel Dombrowski have led the charge in read­
ing Kazantzakis along these process lines. Both emphasize, to begin with, 
that Kazantzakis is not an atheist or unbeliever, at least in any straight­
forward sense. In his 1997 book, Kazantzakis and God, Dombrowski con­
tends that “Kazantzakis’s antipathy to the traditional view of God in the 
Abrahamic religions often leads him to give the impression that he does 
not believe in God, but I will show that a more defensible view is that Ka­
zantzakis does believe in God, but what he means by ‘God’ is something 
that is very often heterodox from the traditional point of view” (1997:2). 
Middleton’s 2007 study of Kazantzakis, Broken Hallelujah, takes a similar 
stance, portraying Kazantzakis as a “believing skeptic,” someone who early 
on lost his faith in Christianity and embarked for the remainder of his life 
on a deep religious quest (2007:1-4). Given Kazantzakis’s skepticism, Mid­
dleton acknowledges that “It would be stretching the point either to label
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Kazantzakis Christian or to think of him as a theologian” (2007:6). Even if 
Kazantzakis cannot be categorized as a Christian (in a narrow or traditional 
sense), Middleton argues that Kazantzakis should be seen as a profoundly 
religious writer who worked within a broadly Christian context and even 
accepted some sort of belief in God, which Middleton aligns with ‘panenthe­
ism’: “In time Kazantzakis spoke, and frequently, of a transhistorical refer­
ent of experience, some presence matching the word ‘God,’ yet he pictured 
it panentheistically and not theistically. Such panentheism...describes God 
as the circumambient reality including all things” (2007:2).11 Echoing the 
title of his book, Middleton goes on to express his central thesis as follows: 
“while Kazantzakis may not be claimed for Christianity, because he was a 
believing skeptic throughout his life, he nonetheless thrummed to its major 
themes and personalities. In short, Kazantzakis sang broken hallelujahs” 
(2007:3).12
Kazantzakis’s broken hallelujahs, according to Middleton and 
Dombrowski, sound distinctly panentheist, delivered in the key of process 
theology. The traditional theist view, as noted earlier, has been that God is 
impassible and immutable, this resting upon the Platonist assumption that 
perfection entails changelessness. Influenced by Bergson’s evolutionary 
philosophy, however, Kazantzakis rejected this traditional view, affirming 
instead a dynamic, struggling, fiery, and passionate God. Relying primarily 
on the Spiritual Exercises, Dombrowski is careful to point out that Kazant- 
zakis’s conception of God is not just another monopolar version of theism, 
where God is this time a purely immanent God of becoming (rather than 
a God of pure being) (see Dombrowski 1997:70-72). Despite this being a 
common reading of Kazantzakis,13 Dombrowski argues that Kazantzakis 
also accepted an unchanging, eternal, and transcendent aspect of God— 
thus making him a genuinely dipolar theist.
Nevertheless, it is their shared belief in divine mutability and passi- 
bility that distinguishes Kazantzakis and process theists from their classical 
counterparts. The notion of an evolving and suffering God is, as Middleton 
states (2007:62), “part of a once-lost-but-recently-reclaimed aspect of the 
Christian tradition,” and Kazantzakis and process theologians sought to re­
discover and renew it:
Where Kazantzakis speaks of God as part of the evolutionary process,
actively involved within our world and affected by its events, sometimes to
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the point o f  needing and agitating us to help God advance in time, process 
theologians emphasize how God stirs the creative advance with initial 
vocational aims designed to optimize fulfillment for subjective becoming. 
(Middleton 2007:92)
Kazantzakis expresses this point provocatively when saying that we 
are called to be ‘the saviors of God’ by transubstantiating matter into spirit. 
But this theme Middleton also finds in process theology. For example, in 
the philosophy of Lewis Ford just as much as in the novels of Kazantzakis, 
“we work with God to develop the creative advance and contribute to the 
richness of the divine experience. God saves us, then, and we save God” 
(Middleton 2007:87). This soteriological vision is thus underwritten by a 
relational view of reality, where salvation is “a dialogical endeavor” involv­
ing “the positive interplay between our freedom and divine agency” (90). 
Indeed, for Middleton, the idea that we can contribute to and enrich the 
divine life and even ‘save’ God is one that “unites the distinctive writings of 
Kazantzakis and Whitehead” (75) and “can serve to call us to a faith that is 
adventurous and risky (77).14
There is much to be said for the process interpretation of Kazantza­
kis, and there are undoubtedly close correspondences between Kazantza- 
kis’s view of God and that of process theologians. However, the process 
reading is limited in certain respects, the first of which has to do with the 
fact that Kazantzakis was not acquainted with the works of Whitehead and 
Hartshorne. Attributing the process view to Kazantzakis might therefore 
seem anachronistic, in which case the process reading is more of a creative 
appropriation of Kazantzakis than a faithful interpretation. Dombrowski 
responds to this charge by noting that, even if Kazantzakis was not aware of 
Whitehead and Hartshorne, “he was very much familiar with another proc­
ess theist, Bergson. And dipolar, process theism is as old as Plato” (1997:72). 
Both Middleton and Dombrowski further point to precedents in Christian 
theology, with Dombrowski noting “certain oddities in the Christian tradi­
tion itself” (e.g., the traditional Christian belief that God is immutable and 
yet knows and loves the world) as also possibly leading Kazantzakis towards 
the process view (Dombrowski 1997:74; Middleton 2007:62-66).
These are contentious matters of historical influence, and there is not 
the space to investigate them here. But even if Dombrowski is correct in
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identifying Kazantzakis’s sources of influence, these sources (including the 
writings of Plato and Bergson) offer only a rudimentary version of dipolar 
theism, far removed from the systematic detail one finds in later process 
thinkers. Kazantzakis’s inspiration, therefore, largely remains a mystery.
A more significant limitation in the process reading is the emphasis 
it places on dipolarity in Kazantzakis’s thinking. In the final section of the 
paper I will argue that Kazantzakis’s most fundamental commitment was to 
a form of monism that overcomes any such dualism.
Kazantzakis as postmodern
Another increasingly prominent way of reading Kazantzakis’s lan­
guage about God is by way of postmodern philosophy and theology. The 
theoretical basis of postmodernism was first worked out in France in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly in the writings of Jacques Derrida, 
Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, 
and Luce Irigaray, before being transplanted to other parts of the world. 
Considered negatively, postmodern philosophy stands in opposition to 
modern philosophy as inaugurated by Locke and Descartes in the seven­
teenth century and culminating in the work of Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Kant and the French philosophes in the eighteenth century. A cen­
tral tenet of modern philosophy is ‘metaphysical realism,’ the view that 
there is an objective world or mind-independent reality, and that there are 
facts regarding the nature of the world that hold true irrespective of the be­
liefs and investigative techniques of human beings. Against this, postmod­
ern philosophers often subscribe to ‘anti-realism,’ the view that there is no 
objective, mind-independent reality, and what passes as ‘reality’ is nothing 
but a social or conceptual construct. Further, if there is no objective real­
ity, there can be no (objective) truth corresponding to that reality. Or, as 
postmoderns like to say, the truth is that there is no (capitalized, absolute) 
Truth. Even the very distinction between truth and falsity is questioned, 
and indeed all binary oppositions that initially appear fixed are revealed to 
be permeable and unstable. As a result, the logic of identity (evident in the 
Hegelian dialectic where two terms in an opposition— e.g., being/nonbeing, 
speech/writing— are synthesized to produce a new, higher unity) is replaced 
with a logic of difference, where diversity and heterogeneity are celebrated.
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In line with the emphasis on difference, the modern (e.g., Cartesian) notion 
of a universal and timeless subject that has a permanent identity or essence 
gives way to the idea of historically embedded, malleable, and fragmented 
subjectivities.
This, of course, is only a very minimal sketch of some central ide­
as found in postmodern philosophy, but they have often been applied to 
religious concerns, giving rise to a variety of postmodern theologies. Fol­
lowing Merold Westphal’s useful typology, postmodern theology or phi­
losophy of religion tends to be expressed in one, or a combination, of the 
following forms: negative theology, Nietzschean ‘death of God’ theology, 
and phenomenological approaches (see Westphal 1998:583-586). Firstly, 
then, one of the wellsprings of postmodern theology has been the negative 
or apophatic tradition, which insists on the radical transcendence, incom­
prehensibility, and ineffability of God. Amongst postmodern thinkers, ap- 
ophaticism functions as a way to overcome idolatrous ways of talking about 
God that are inscribed or restricted by the categories of philosophy (such as 
‘presence,’ ‘cause,’ ‘being,’ etc.). A second stream in postmodern religious 
thought has been the ‘death of God’ movement that arose in American the­
ology in the 1960s. Taking their lead from Nietzsche’s famous parable of 
the madman (in The Gay Science §125), theologians such as Gabriel Vaha- 
nian, Paul van Buren, William Hamilton, and Thomas J. J. Altizer advocated 
a radically new, ‘post-Christian’ theology that sought to overturn or secu­
larize traditional Christian doctrine. More recently, Mark C. Taylor blended 
this Nietzschean motif with deconstruction, which he introduced in his 
landmark work Erring: A Postmodern A/theology as “the ‘hermeneutic’ of the 
death of God” (1984:6). In Taylor’s deconstructive a/theology, the tradi­
tional polarity between belief and unbelief is destabilized so as to allow for 
previously neglected dimensions of the divine to appear within the space 
of undecidability signified by the slash in ‘a/theology,’ and in this way to fi­
nally transcend the nihilism that the death of God inevitably brings. A third 
major influence on postmodern philosophy of religion has been the phe­
nomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, and particularly its appropriation 
by a group of theologically-motivated French phenomenologists, including 
Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, and Jean-Luc Marion.
As this indicates, postmodernism need not be atheistic or inimical to 
religion: if modernism involved a process of secularization, postmodernity
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is marked by a return to God or an awakening of a new experience of the 
divine—hence the adoption of such terms as ‘post-secular’ and ‘anatheism’ 
(see Kearney 2010).15 It might be tempting, therefore, to read such a post­
modern reclamation of God back into Kazantzakis, viewing him as moving 
beyond both the premodern religious naïveté of our ancient and medieval 
forebears and the suspicion and skepticism of the disillusioned modern 
world, in this way creating the space for new images of God to be construct­
ed. Recent commentators, in fact, have advocated such a postmodern read­
ing of Kazantzakis, restricting themselves to the first and second forms of 
postmodern theology outlined above. I will return to apophaticism in the 
next section; also, I will not touch upon phenomenological approaches, giv­
en that neither classical phenomenology nor the recent ‘theological turn’ in 
phenomenology have made an impact on Kazantzakis scholarship (despite 
the interesting possibilities phenomenological readings might afford). In­
stead, I will concentrate on the second (Nietzschean) strand, particularly as 
it has been developed under the impetus of Derridean deconstruction.
A number of calls have recently been made to read Kazantzakis as a pre­
cursor of postmodern trends and sensibilities. Dimitris Tziovas, for example, 
has argued that Kazantzakis’s work is best interpreted not through the lens 
of ‘being,’ where this is understood as “an eternal essence or a structure to be 
recovered and as a truth or god to be discovered,” but by way of the postmod­
ern notion of ‘becoming,’ which is “associated with struggle, freedom and an 
open-ended process, representing the constant quest and the transcendence 
of limits” (2009:84). Tziovas therefore proposes a new way of reading Ka­
zantzakis’s novels, one that passes “from the ontology of being to the contin­
gency of becoming,” so as “to see his novels as open and dynamic texts rather 
than closed and static ones” (87). This openness manifests itself in the way 
in which Kazantzakis handles the antitheses that loom large in his work (e.g., 
spirit-matter, freedom-death, Zorba-Boss). In Tziovas’s view, Kazantzakis 
does not seek a final reconciliation of these dualities in an eventual synthesis, 
but rather allows them to remain in perpetual tension, thus giving his works 
their open-ended nature. But this is openness of a specifically postmodern 
sort, entailing ceaseless flux and becoming, and ruling out (the modernist 
ideals of) teleology, unity, and certainty:
Becoming in Kazantzakis should not be seen in terms o f  development, 
evolution or maturity, but as an inconclusive process o f  re-inventions,
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transgressions, retellings and even contradictions. At one time it might 
have been treated as a struggle, a creative progress, or the hope o f ultimately 
reaching a higher spiritual goal. Now becoming is seen as lacking a goal 
and the emphasis is on open-endedness, relativity and ambiguity. (Tziovas 
2009:88)
Not only determinate endings, but also seemingly fixed meanings and 
truths are challenged and destabilized by Kazantzakis, as highlighted in the 
following passage quoted by Tziovas from the ‘fictional autobiography,’ Re­
port to Greco:
I swaggered as I wrote. Was I not God, doing as I pleased, transubstantiating 
reality, fashioning it as I should have liked it to be—as it should have been?
I was joining truth and falsehood indissolubly together. No, there were no 
longer any such things as truth and falsehood; everything was a soft dough 
which I kneaded and rolled freely, according to the dictates o f  whim, without 
securing permission from anyone. Evidently there is an uncertainty which is 
more certain than certitude itself.16 (Quoted in Tsiovas 2009:90)
As Tziovas comments: “In postmodern fashion, Kazantzakis ques­
tions the ontological solidity of reality (being) and perceives it as a subjec­
tive creation (becoming). Following Nietzsche he declares: “The world is my 
own creation. Everything, both visible and invisible, is a deceptive dream’” 
(2009:90).17 The boundaries between fact and fiction therefore dissolve, and 
truth becomes, as in the words of Nietzsche, “a mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms...truths are illusions about which one 
has forgotten that this is what they are” (1954:46-47). Operating with such 
a conception of truth, Kazantzakis narrates worlds that are never straight­
forwardly factual (even in his so-called ‘autobiography’), nor simply false, 
but are instead fluid and indeterminate—and it is this open-endedness, ac­
cording to Tziovas, that might account for the continuing appeal of Kazant- 
zakis’s works in our postmodern era.18
Connections between Kazantzakis’s works and postmodern philoso­
phy have also been made by Galanopoulos (2010:7-37)19 and Middleton 
(2007:ch. 6 and conclusion), the latter describing Kazantzakis as a post­
humous or untimely writer who, like Nietzsche, “foresaw much of what we 
now recognize as the postmodern turn, not in literary forms of course, but 
in philosophy and religion. Both thinkers attended to life’s evanescence,
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intuition’s strength, language’s polysemy, storytelling’s persistence, and 
interpretation’s malleability” (Middleton 2007:102). Without wishing to 
downplay these points of ‘philosophical consanguinity,’ as Middleton calls 
them, there are significant limitations to the postmodern reading, and here 
I can only indicate some of these.
As noted earlier, the Nietzschean strand of postmodern theology takes 
the death of God as paving the way for a secular or humanistic brand of 
Christianity, which Middleton ties to Lloyd Geering’s proposal of ‘Christian­
ity without God’ (to borrow the title of one of Geering’s books). What Geer­
ing is specifically proposing is a Christianity released from commitment to 
realist forms of theism, which take God to be an ontologically independ­
ent, supernatural, and objectively existing entity. In their place, Geering 
defends ‘theological non-realism,’ where ‘God’ functions as a symbol of our 
most important moral and spiritual values. According to Middleton, “a sim­
ilar humanistic Christianity permeates Kazantzakis’s life and career,” a view 
he suggests is supported by Kazantzakis’s rejection of conventional theism 
due to its perceived incompatibility with modern science (2007:111). At 
least one problem with Middleton’s reading is that it conflicts with other 
things Middleton says about Kazantzakis—and especially Middleton’s view 
that Kazantzakis develops a form (albeit a nascent form) of process theolo­
gy. Process theism has not usually been developed in a secular, humanistic, 
or non-realist direction (although, admittedly, there is no theoretical obsta­
cle in doing so). Insofar as the variety of process theology that Middleton is 
operating with is realist and non-secular (which it seems to be), there is an 
internal tension in his reading of Kazantzakis. Secondly, it is doubtful that 
Kazantzakis accepted the kind of secular and non-realist theism espoused 
by Geering. The rejection of or skepticism towards traditional (realist, su­
pernaturalist) theism does not equate to a commitment to theological non­
realism, but may instead be a preliminary step towards an unconventional 
and indeed non-Christian, though resolutely realist and non-naturalist, 
version of theism. (It is this relatively unexplored possibility I will take up 
in the last section of the paper.)
A more serious weakness with postmodern accounts of Kazantza­
kis is that many of the central ideas that postmodern thinkers want to 
oppose or transcend form the very nucleus of Kazantzakis’s worldview. 
Illustrative examples, though by no means a comprehensive list, include:
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(i) incredulity towards metanarratives, or all-inclusive, overarching ide­
ologies or systems; (ii) the attempt to overcome onto-theology, this being 
Heidegger’s term for referring to a long-standing metaphysical tradition 
(with Aristotle and Hegel as high points) that strives to render the whole 
realm of beings intelligible to human understanding, and does so by ap­
peal to the supreme being, God;20 (iii) the rejection of knowledge and truth, 
at least when knowledge is considered a matter of accurate representation, 
and truth consists in correspondence to reality or the way things really are; 
and (iv) suspicion towards claims of progress, particularly the Enlighten­
ment belief in human progress and emancipation, and teleological schemes 
such as those of Hegel and Marx, which hold that history is moving towards 
some predetermined higher end. It is not possible to show in any detail 
here how these postmodern ideas or attitudes conflict with Kazantzakis’s 
works, but it may be worth considering, in relation to each of the above, 
that: (i) early on, Kazantzakis sought a “theory of the cosmos and of hu­
manity’s raison d’etre” (Kazantzakis 2012a:39), which he constructed in 
large part from materials by Bergson, and which guided and framed his 
subsequent creative work; (ii) Kazantzakis consistently upheld ‘God’ (albeit 
in his idiosyncratic understanding of the term) as the interpretative key 
for unlocking the secrets of reality, this contributing to the perception of 
Kazantzakis as a profoundly religious thinker; (iii) Kazantzakis’s medium 
of expression is literary, not propositional, but this does not lead him to 
abandon all distinctions between truth and falsehood in favor of a perpet­
ual open-endedness and undecidability, as claimed by Tziovas, but rather 
brings him to a metaphysical vision of a unified whole (to be elaborated in 
the following section); and (iv) despite coming to reject any simple or linear 
claims to progress (as in Marxism), Kazantzakis’s fictional heroes embody 
the teleological principle of spiritual ‘ascent,’ a passionate leap upward in 
the struggle to transmute matter into spirit.
Kazantzakis as idealist
I do not wish to deny that points of influence or similarity can be iden­
tified between Kazantzakis’s writings and each of the foregoing streams of 
thought (atheistic materialism, process philosophy, postmodern theology, 
etc.). What I wish to propose, however, is that Kazantzakis’s conception 
of the divine (especially in his most mature and productive period: the last
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ten years of his life, during which time he wrote his major novels) can also 
be understood as an expression (a ‘mythopoesis’) of the metaphysical view 
known as Absolute Idealism. By seeing Kazantzakis’s God in idealist light, 
Kazantzakis’s interactions with and indebtedness to Eastern religion, and 
especially Buddhism, become more apparent. Surprisingly, these connec­
tions between Kazantzakis’s work and Eastern thought form a significant 
lacuna in contemporary scholarship,21 and part of my aim here is to take a 
small step towards rectifying this.
It will be helpful, to begin with, to sketch the history and metaphys­
ics of idealism, as it has developed in both West and East. In the modern 
West, idealism came into prominence as a movement in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries in German philosophy. Rejecting Kant’s de­
limitation of metaphysics, philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling, Schopen­
hauer, and above all Hegel sought to reinvigorate metaphysics, principally 
through the development of systems of ‘absolute idealism.’ In the idealist 
view, the most basic or ultimate reality is ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’— everything else, 
including matter and the physical world, is only an appearance or expres­
sion of mind. For the German idealists, this ultimate reality is the ‘Abso­
lute,’ that which has an unconditioned existence (not conditioned by, or 
dependent upon, anything else), and is usually deemed to be the whole of 
things, conceived as unitary, spiritual, self-knowing, and rationally intelligi­
ble. An important successor of this idealist movement was the British form 
of idealism that held sway in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and included such philosophers as F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, Edward Caird, 
J. M. E. McTaggart, and Bernard Bosanquet. Turning away from the natu­
ralism, utilitarianism, and empiricism characteristic of British philosophy 
(e.g., the work of Hume), the British idealists held that physical objects and 
the subjective points of view of conscious individuals stand in a system of 
‘internal relations’ called the ‘Absolute.’
Although in Anglophone philosophy idealism would not survive the 
hostile turn taken early in the twentieth century against metaphysics, 
the idealist view remains a venerable part of certain streams of Buddhism 
and Hinduism. For example, the Indian tradition of Yogacara (Sanskrit: 
‘Practice of Yoga’) is a leading proponent of idealism within Mahayana 
Buddhism. Founded in the fourth or fifth century A.D. by the Indian phi­
losopher Asanga and his half-brother Vasubandhu, the Yogacara school
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disavows realism, or the commonsense belief in an independently existing 
world. As Peter Harvey explains, “in the Yogacara, the role of the mind in 
constructing the world is so emphasized that all concepts of an external 
physical reality are rejected: the perceived world is seen as ‘representation- 
only’ (vijhapti-matra) or ‘thought-only’ (citta-matra)” (1990:106).22 All that 
really exists is awareness or consciousness (vijhana), an inconceivable and 
ineffable ‘emptiness’ that transcends customary dualistic divisions. For the 
Yogacarin, then, emptiness is not merely the lack of an intrinsic or uncon­
ditioned nature (as the Madyamaka school holds), but designates (to quote 
from Stephen Laumakis) “the original or natural state of the mind in which 
there is no dualistic distinction between the knower and the known or the 
perceiving subject and the perceived object” (2008:146). Ultimate reality, 
within this view, is an undifferentiated consciousness, empty of any duality.
A similar non-dual view can be found in the Advaita Vedanta tradition 
of Hinduism. The wider Vedanta school constitutes the most influential of 
the six ‘orthodox’ Hindu systems (darsana) of philosophy, and it is divided 
amongst its members on how to interpret the relation that exists between 
the atman (self) and Brahman (Ultimate Reality) as this is depicted in the 
philosophically-oriented thought of the Upanishads. The interpretation of 
this relation given by Shankara (or Sankaracarya [‘Samkara the Teacher’], 
in the early eight century; traditionally A.D. 788-820) and the school that 
developed in his wake centered on the notion of ‘a-dvaita’ meaning (in San­
skrit) ‘non-dual’ and referring to the tradition’s monism, the belief that 
there are no separate things, so that reality consists in a unified whole. The 
Advaita school therefore rejects all duality, identifies Brahman with our true 
and unchanging self or atman (as distinct from our ‘empirical self’), and 
takes Brahman to be the sole reality. The role of the ‘Absolute’ in German 
and British idealism is here played by Brahman: a pure undifferentiated con­
sciousness that is the ultimate foundation and goal of all existence. Only 
by ‘realizing’ or awakening to one’s identity with Brahman and the non-dual 
nature of reality can release or liberation (moksa) be achieved from the cycle 
of birth and rebirth (samsara).
Of the many connections that could be made between these forms of 
idealism and Kazantzakis’s work, I wish to focus briefly on the shared com­
mitment to monism. Perhaps the greatest influence on Kazantzakis’s mon­
ism has been Bergson, though another significant but neglected source of
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influence is the idealist philosophy of Hegel. Bergson’s influence on this 
score, as in many other areas, is well documented. Middleton and Bien, for 
instance, point out that although Darwinian evolutionary theory may have 
initially undermined Kazantzakis’s religious faith, it also drove Kazantzakis 
towards a Bergsonian and monistic outlook:
Darwinism...set him [i.e., Kazantzakis] on the road toward a relational 
philosophy in which, viewing ourselves as bound up with the processes of 
nature and history, we realize that “there is no such thing as ‘me,’ ‘you,’ and 
‘he’; everything is a unity.”23 (Middleton and Bien 1996:3)
The ‘relational philosophy’ spoken of here is, of course, that of Berg­
son. Initially at least, Bergson seems far removed from monism, as his 
philosophy is pervaded by various stark dualisms: there are two kinds or 
sources of knowledge (analysis and intuition); there are two forms of time 
(scientific or clock time and ‘duration,’ la durée); there are two kinds of mo­
rality and religion (those that are open, universal, and dynamic, and those 
that are closed, local, and static), etc.24 Bergson, however, privileges one of 
the terms in these oppositions, taking the other as derivative and defective, 
and thus he can be seen as advocating a form of monism. With respect 
to time, for example, Bergson holds that it is somewhat falsified when it 
is measured objectively as a set of discrete moments or instants (as hap­
pens in ‘clock time’), while its true nature can only be intuited or experi­
enced as a continuous and essentially indivisible stream (what Bergson calls 
‘duration’). More generally, our intellect, guided by our needs, habitually 
employs the methods of analysis and abstraction to impose stability and 
homogeneity on the incessant motion of life and its evolution, which can 
be immediately accessed only by means of ‘intuition’— a kind of intellectual 
sympathy involving direct participation in, or identification with, the other.
It was in such terms that Kazantzakis presented Bergson to the mem­
bers of the Educational Society in Athens, in January 1913, after having at­
tended Bergson’s lectures in Paris in 1907-1908. In a spirited overview and 
defense of Bergson’s philosophy, Kazantzakis explained that Bergson does 
not regard matter and energy dualistically, but rather holds to the monist 
view that matter is a congealed form of energy:
Matter and energy are substantially one and the same; there is no 
dualism. Matter is simply energy’s condensation, its stable equilibrium.25 
(Kazantzakis 1983:280)
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As is well known, Bergson’s dualistic battle between the vital impulse 
(élan vital) and materiality takes on momentous significance in Kazantza- 
kis’s fiction, with its recurring depictions of the struggle between the di­
vine call to surge upward toward life and creativity, and the forces pushing 
downward toward death and stagnation. In Kazantzakis’s view, however, 
the élan and materiality are not separate in Bergson’s system; rather, matter 
is only the congealed aspect of the élan s own substance, thus underscoring 
the monist tendencies within Bergson’s dualist perspective.
Influenced by Bergson, monism came to be one of Kazantzakis’s most 
deeply held convictions. Consider, for example, the summary Kazantzakis 
gave of his philosophy in a ‘symposium’ held on the eve of his departure 
from Alexandria in February 1927 (and recorded in his Egypt journal):
I am a monist. I feel deeply that Matter and Spirit are one. Within me I 
feel only one essence. However, when I am forced to express myself as I am 
tonight, and formulate this essence, l am forced, naturally, to express myself 
with words, that is to say, with logic. Consequently, following the nature o f  
logic, I am compelled to separate what by nature is inseparable. And since 
human senses are limited, out o f  all the infinite, probable aspects or sources, 
i f  you will, o f  reality, I distinguish only two: that which we call Matter and 
that which we call Spirit.26 (Kazantzakis 1975:78-79)
Reality is ultimately one, and it is divided into parts only by our use of 
language and logic, which “separate what by its nature is inseparable.” The 
monist vision of ‘an indestructible unity behind the ceaseless flux’ (to bor­
row from the end of The Saviors o f  God] see Kazantzakis 1960:13027) was to 
inform Kazantzakis’s entire life and work, as Bien observes:
On the one hand he [i.e., Kazantzakis] laments the anticommunist 
atmosphere in Greece [around 1928]; on the other he scorns the communists 
themselves. As always in Kazantzakis’s personality as well as in his works, 
we are forced to confront this bewildering conjunction o f opposites: his 
“positions” are not positions but temporary shifts o f  emphasis—swings 
toward either pole o f  a duality explicable only in terms o f his deepest 
allegiance, which was to Bergsonian monism. (Bien 1989:129)
Bergson, however, might not be the only philosopher Kazantzakis 
was drawing upon when formulating his monist worldview. Another, and 
relatively unacknowledged, source may well have been Hegel’s idealism.28
408
Cult ure
In particular, what Kazantzakis calls the ‘Cretan Glance’ bears much in com­
mon with Hegel’s dialectical process of Aufheben (sublation), where antith­
eses are overcome by ‘raising them up’ into a new totality or whole, while 
preserving elements from each of the opposing pairs. One of the few schol­
ars to have alluded to this, but without explicitly naming Hegel, is Kimon 
Friar. In his Introduction to his translation of Kazantzakis’s Odyssey, Friar 
emphasizes the synthetic— or what might be called ‘monistic’— outlook 
permeating Kazantzakis’s writings: “Basic to all of Kazantzakis’s vision, as 
to that of Yeats, has been the attempt to synthesize what seem to be con­
traries, antitheses, antinomies” (Friar 1958:xviii). Borrowing from Yeats, 
Friar portrays Kazantzakis as the ‘Antithetical Man,’ “for his own life and 
thought were formed in a double vision of tension between opposites, an 
explosive conflict which ascended unceasingly upward toward higher and 
higher spiritual reaches over an abyss of nothingness” (1958:xxv). This 
‘double vision’ looks to Kazantzakis’s birthplace of Crete as unifying the 
contrasting perspectives of East and West. For example, the Greek ideal 
of the rational self and disciplined will stands in opposition to the Oriental 
ideal of self-renunciation and abandonment to mysterious and impersonal 
powers. As Kazantzakis explains (in a letter to a young critic, quoted by 
Friar), he sought to transcend and ‘sublate’ these contrasting ideals by way 
of the ‘Cretan Glance’:
Crete, for me (and not, naturally, for all Cretans), is the synthesis which I 
always pursue, the synthesis of Greece and the Orient. I neither feel Europe 
in me nor a clear and distilled classical Greece; nor do I at all feel the anarchic 
chaos and the will-less perseverance of the Orient. I feel something else, a 
synthesis, a being that not only gazes on the abyss without disintegrating, 
but which, on the contrary, is filled with coherence, pride, and manliness by 
such a vision. This glance which confronts life and death so bravely, I call 
Cretan. (Quoted in Friar 1958:xix).
The structure of the Glance, however, is distinctly Hegelian. Just as 
the advance of Hegel’s Absolute toward self-consciousness is founded on 
the sublation of antitheses, so Kazantzakis’s Cretan vision is reached by 
progressively surmounting all dualisms, until one attains to the One.29
The monist and idealist character of Kazantzakis’s thought can also 
be traced to his lifelong engagement with Eastern religions, especially
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Buddhism.30 Kazantzakis felt a profound personal connection to the Bud­
dha, listing him in Report to Greco among Christ, Lenin, and Odysseus as 
one of “the decisive steps in my ascent” (Kazantzakis 1973:15).31 Although 
the influence of Buddhism in Kazantzakis’s works has not gone unnoticed, 
what remains underexplored is the way in which the metaphysics of Bud­
dhism (or some Buddhist schools) has marked Kazantzakis’s conception 
of God and ultimate reality. To highlight this, I will briefly turn to one of 
Kazantzakis’s most remarkable, though unjustly neglected, works: his play 
Buddha. This was published in 1956, a year before his death, but it was a 
project that obsessed him for many years; he began the first draft in 1922 
in Vienna and gave the work its definitive shape only in 1941-1943 during 
the German occupation of Greece. In Kazantzakis’s eyes, at least, this play 
ranked highly within the formidable body of work he had completed. As he 
was to say shortly before he died: “Buddha is my swan song. It says every­
thing. I’m glad that I have managed to utter...my final word in time, before 
I go” (quoted in Bien 1983:xviii). This high estimation is echoed by Peter 
Bien, one of the few scholars to have extensively studied the play:
But o f  all Kazantzakis’s immense output, the play Buddha, I believe, is the 
clearest, most genuine and comprehensive exposition o f  his mature position, 
because it both isolates and amalgamates the disparates so deftly, and also 
because it so openly and unapologetically treats the aesthetic as the primary 
way to salvation.32 (Bien 1977:270).
What characterizes the play is its pronounced (metaphysical) idealism, 
understood in terms of the notions of reality as mind-dependent and as an 
essentially unified whole. These notions find expression not only in the 
dialogue, but even more so through the structure of the work. The play 
unfolds on two levels: a ‘realistic’ plot set in the central square of a Chi­
nese village, which narrates the rise of the Yangtze River that floods the 
village and drowns its inhabitants; and an ‘idealistic’ part, which frames 
and is interweaved into the real-world action, thus revealing the latter to 
be nothing but the product of the imagination. As Bien points out, it is the 
skillful way in which Kazantzakis destabilizes the sense of reality (ours and 
that of the characters) that gives “the work its uniqueness and distinction” 
(1977:254).33 The repeated set changes, in particular, reinforce the illusory 
character of (empirical) reality, as in Act I when the Magician puts on a yel­
low mask and:
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Silently the set crumbles, as in a dream. The scenery changes—the Yangtze 
encircles all like a ring. In the center is an island, and in its center a huge, 
dried-out tree. Underneath the tree, sitting cross-legged, is Buddha.34 
(Kazantzakis 1983:42)
All plays, like any creative works, are the expression and product of 
the mind of the artist, but Kazantzakis (through the character of the Magi­
cian) wants to take matters further and say the same about the great Play 
we call ‘life’—this too is created and constituted by the mind. The mind 
(or more precisely the intuitive and imaginative mind, as opposed to the 
theoretical, intellectualizing mind) is therefore imbued with the power not 
only to construct different worlds, but also to penetrate past the empirical 
world through to the ultimate reality and the underlying oneness of all. In 
idealist fashion, then, Kazantzakis draws a sharp contrast between appear­
ance and reality, multiplicity and unity, in this way indicating the extent to 
which a radical and difficult conversion of our gaze is required if we are to 
overcome ignorance and illusion. Bien puts this well when discussing the 
monist outlook of the play:
By making the Magician call life a game and state audaciously that he can 
escape fate by changing the eyes with which he views the world, Kazantzakis 
is attempting to remind us that our normal, commonsensical conception o f  
reality is outrageously incorrect, so incorrect that we come closer to truth 
with "play” instead o f  seriousness, "evasion” instead o f  confrontation. Where 
we go wrong in our commons ensical approach is to think that the multiplicity 
we see before us is real. We cannot see through this multiplicity to the One 
behind it; thus we think that individual beings are truly separate from 
one another, and we think as well that life is separate from death. (Bien 
1977:257)
But if this correctly represents Kazantzakis’s mature position, then 
Western philosophical and theological sources cannot provide the full pic­
ture on Kazantzakis’s views on God. An equally important source in this 
respect is the East, and in particular the idealist and monist metaphysics 
of Buddhism. What this implies is that, by turning East, Kazantzakis man­
aged to finally overcome the dualism and materialism he inherited from 
the Western (and especially Christian) tradition. Rather than seeing the 
non-physical or spiritual realm, inhabited by God and angelic beings, in op­
position to the material world made up of land and sea, trees and plants,
4 1 1
Culture
animals and humans, and rather than positing an infinite ontological divide 
between the Creator and the creation, one that only the God-Man (Christ) 
could traverse, Kazantzakis’s later work displays the marks of a distinctly 
‘non-dual’ conception of reality, indebted in large part to Eastern forms of 
thought. There is no sharp divide, in this view, between self and other; in­
deed, there is a fundamental identity. What results, and what is arguably 
present in Kazantzakis’s later fiction, is a relational view o f reality: to be is to 
be in relation with others, and above all with the Other (Brahman, Buddha, 
Christ, etc.). In such a relational ontology, evident in the East but also not 
unknown in the West (for example, in German and British idealism, and 
more recently in process philosophy), the world is not an assemblage of per­
sistent entities or things, but is a complex web of interconnections or relations, 
so that the deepest level of reality consists in a holistic connectivity. Further, 
this all-inclusive and harmonious whole, or ‘Absolute,’ is conceived in mind­
like terms as a non-physical consciousness, experience, or ‘idea.’
Towards the end of his trip to China in 1935, Kazantzakis was to en­
counter two astounding expressions of this idealist view, which looks not to 
the phenomena of matter and motion, but to that which transcends these phe­
nomena as disclosing the true nature of reality. While staying in a Buddhist 
temple in a Chinese village, Kazantzakis noticed in the garden of the temple 
a marble pedestal separated from its statue of the Buddha. The pedestal 
was holding up literally nothing. This, in turn, reminded him of a strange 
concert he attended earlier, where no sounds at all were made:
The bows were raised, the flute players brought their flutes near their lips 
without touching them and began to move rapidly, the tips o f  their fingers 
on the holes. The bows played in the air without touching the strings, the 
sticks stopped quietly before touching the skin o f the drum, the harpist moved 
his hand in the air and sometimes stopped and listened ecstatically to the 
immaterial sound. Nothing was heard. (Kazantzakis 1982:249)
Kazantzakis recounts that:
When the mute concert ended, I bent to the guest next to me and posed my 
question. And he smilingly answered me: “For trained ears the sound is 
superfluous. The redeemed souls have no need o f  the act. The true Buddha 
has no body.” (1982:249; emphasis mine)
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This signaledto Kazantzakis the way in which materiality andtemporality 
are transcended in Buddhist culture to reach the invisible, inaudible, 
and eternal realm of spirit:
Invisible statues, silent music— these are, I thought, the highest flowers of 
the muddy root of the body. (1982:250)
For Kazantzakis, as much as for Chinese Buddhists and Indian Ad- 
vaitins, reality is One and this One does not exist in any way that can be 
adequately captured by words and sounds, but is rather ‘nothingness’—a 
pure spirit we are called to return to and realize as our ownmost.
Notes
1 A similar observation has been made by Pandelis Prevelakis (1961:181nl28).
2 She was referring to the incongruity of “atheists like ourselves” (i.e., herself and Nikos 
Kazantzakis) getting married in an Orthodox church in 1945. But in such contexts the Greek 
word for atheist’ may connote more broadly someone who is not religious in any conventional 
sense, rather than someone who explicitly rejects the existence of God.
3 An even closer companion of Kazantzakis, Pandelis Prevelakis also refers to his friend as an 
atheist (1961:186-187n204).
4 Glicksberg, at least, acknowledges the paradoxical nature of this aspect of Kazantzakis’s thought:
Numerous contradictions also crop up in Kazantzakis's work. He employs religious terms— 
faith, striving, God, perfection, spirit, transcendence—to embody his symbolic version of the 
quest. He finds it enormously difficult to reconcile this religious terminology with his professed 
atheism and his nihilistic Weltanschauung. (1975:289)
5 The charge, however, was eventually dropped. See Antonakes (1996:25); in this valuable 
study, Antonakes recounts the reception of Kazantzakis’s works in Greece, focusing on the 
ways in which his religious ideas were received and (mis)understood by church leaders and 
literary critics.
6 See Antonakes (1996:25-27), who reports (30) that the proposal that Kazantzakis’s books 
be banned was rejected in 1955 by the government of Greece. Demetrios Constantelos 
(1996:50-51) contests the view that the Synod condemned Kazantzakis’s works, but this does 
not seem justified given the evidence provided by Antonakes.
7 For example, Constantelos holds that, “In terms of Orthodox dogma he [Kazantzakis] is 
heterodox, but in terms of religious teachings—spiritual-mystical religious teachings in 
particular—he is Orthodox” (1996:37-38).
8 This is not to deny that Kazantzakis could be considered an ‘atheist’ in some sense, especially 
since the concept o f ‘atheism’ is context-sensitive: its meaning is dependent upon the 
religious system or conception of deity it is seeking to oppose. No one is generically atheist. 
And there is no doubt that, with respect to some ideas about God, Kazantzakis was an atheist.
9 Much of Bien’s post-Christian reading is predicated on his interpretation of Kazantzakis’s 
attitudes towards death, and in particular Kazantzakis’s rejection of the afterlife. What 
needs to be distinguished, however, is whether Kazantzakis is denying (i) all conceptions 
of the afterlife or immortality, or (ii) belief in personal survival after death, or (iii) hope in 
postmortem rewards and fear of postmortem punishments. Even if Kazantzakis rejects 
(ii) and (iii), it is far from clear that he also rejects (i). Consider, for example, the following
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passage from Report to Greco: “man is not immortal, but rather serves Something or Someone 
that is immortal.” (Kazantzakis 1973:412). The reading I develop in the last section of the 
paper will seek to make sense of such passages. It is also important to note that Bergson’s 
philosophy is not incompatible with postmortem existence, as has been argued by G. William 
Barnard (2011:ch. 28).
10 The principle is helpfully elucidated in Dombrowski (1997:66-69).
11 Middleton also describes Kazantzakis as an ‘antitheist,’ a term borrowed from literary critic 
James F. Lea. Middleton explains: “Antitheism is not a rejection of belief in God’s existence; 
rather, it is a radical attempt to wrestle with traditional ways of thinking about the divine. 
Resisting metaphysical or theological pretensions, antitheists enjoin us to engage ceaselessly 
in the practice of theological construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction” (2007:94). 
Middleton goes on to classify both Kazantzakis and process theologians as antitheists 
“because they both scrutinize our culture’s very deep theological assumptions and urge us to 
take increasing responsibility for our religious searching” (95).
12 A little later, Middleton states that “his [Kazantzakis’s] views comport, albeit uneasily, with 
those opinions espoused by individuals associated with shaping and reshaping Christianity” 
(2007:6). Similarly, in an earlier piece, an Introduction to an edited collection, co-authored 
with Peter Bien, Middleton wrote: “The point we are trying to make is that Kazantzakis... 
was actually in tune with thinkers who, although challenging Augustinian orthodoxy, are 
within the allowable bounds of Christian speculation” (1996:15; emphasis in the original). This 
is repeated towards the end of the same Introduction: “Assuredly, Kazantzakis’s witness 
lies within the boundaries of a biblical faith still in the making” (22). I find this a somewhat 
strange claim, as it is not clear what “the allowable bounds” are and who is drawing them.
13 Kimon Friar, for example, seems to have promoted such a reading, as Dombrowski notes 
(1997:65). Also, Peter Bien’s emphasis on Kazantzakis’s naturalism and the attendant denial 
of any transcendent realm independent of the physical world (e.g., heaven and hell) suggests 
that any existing deity would have to be a purely immanent one.
14 Middleton discusses the connections between Kazantzakis and process thought in greater 
detail in his earlier work, Novel Theology: Nikos Kazantzakis’s Encounter with Whiteheadian 
Process Theism (2000).
15 Kearney explains that the ‘ana’ in ‘anatheism’ “signals a movement of return to what I call 
a primordial wager, to an inaugural instant of reckoning at the root of belief. It marks a 
reopening of that space where we are free to choose between faith or nonfaith. As such, 
anatheism is about the option of retrieved belief” (2010:7; emphasis in the original).
16 The quotation is from Report to Greco (1973:ch. 16, Return to Crete; Knossos).
17 The quotation is from Report to Greco (1973:ch. 23, Paris; Nietzsche the Great Martyr).
18 A similar view has recently been advanced by Charitini Christodoulou (2012), who conceives 
of ‘openness’ in terms of the process of becoming, and specifically the process of the 
formation of identity and meaning; focusing on The Last Temptation, she regards the novel 
and its main characters as exemplifying this sort of openness.
19 See, especially, pages 22-28, where Kazantzakis’s response to nihilism is thought to parallel 
various themes in postmodern philosophy.
20 Middleton notices this also, stating that: “Whereas postmodernism signals an age of 
incredulity toward metaphysics and metanarratives, Kazantzakis ultimately fails the 
postmodern test. In the end, he suggests that Something or Someone provokes him toward 
writing stories that disclose being, reality, and God” (2007:116-117).
21 For example, in Middleton and Bien’s 1996 collection, God’s Struggler: Religion in the Writings 
of Nikos Kazantzakis, there is no consideration of the Buddhist influences on Kazantzakis’s 
work, and there is no mention at all of Hinduism. Lewis Owens (2001:269-284) draws 
interesting parallels between Kazantzakis and the idealism of Plotinus and Berkeley. But 
Owens’s emphasis is on apophaticism, rather than on idealism. Also, no connections are
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made in Owens’s paper between the thought o f Kazantzakis and Eastern philosophy.
22 Some scholars, however, dispute the idealist interpretation o f Yogacara— see, for example, 
Dan Lusthaus (1998:66-67 §2).
23 The quote is from Report to Greco (1973:105).
24 See also the 1910 Introduction to Matter and Memory (first published in 1896), where 
Bergson wrote that Matter and Memory “is frankly dualistic” since it “affirms the reality o f 
spirit and the reality o f matter” (1911:vii).
25 Translation taken from Bien (1989:46). It is not clear, however, that this is an accurate 
reading o f Bergson, who is often seen instead as advocating a dualism o f matter and spirit, 
where these are coexistent and interdependent.
26 Kazantzakis proceeds to replace the dichotomy between matter and spirit with that between 
‘hunger’ and ‘pathos,’ which he explains in a way that does not seem to comport well with 
traditional idealism: “I use the word pathos and not the word spirit because this word has 
assumed an ideological, immaterial distilled content that is incomprehensible and hateful
to me. ‘Spirit’ contains a great deal more ‘matter’ than materialists imagine; just as ‘matter’ 
contains a great deal more ‘spirit’ than idealists imagine” (1975:79).
27 In line with this monist vision comes an emphasis on the unity and solidarity o f humanity: “We 
are all one, we are all an imperiled essence. If at the far end of the world a spirit degenerates,
it drags down our spirit into its own degradation. If one mind at the far end o f the world sinks 
into idiocy, our own temples overbrim with darkness” (Kazantzakis 1960:115).
28 Bien (1989:50) does point to the continuity o f Bergson’s thought with that o f Hegel, but 
Hegel’s influence on Kazantzakis remains unexplored.
29 However, as Friar points out, sublation in Kazantzakis is only ever momentary: “The Cretan 
Glance for Kazantzakis...was an attempted synthesis o f those contraries which he believed 
underlie all human and natural endeavor, but a synthesis not so much o f permanent as of 
momentary harmony, which in turn builds into a greater tension and explodes toward a 
higher and more inclusive synthesis in an ever upward and spiraling onrush, leaving behind 
it the bloodstained path o f man’s and nature’s endeavors” (1958:xx). Perhaps, then, in 
saying “even this One does not exist,” Kazantzakis was alluding to (what may be called) an 
‘asymptotic monism’: as soon as we reach some higher unity that overcomes a prior antithesis, 
this immediately collapses into (or gives rise to) another antithesis, which again needs to be 
sublated. On this conception, ultimate unity is never reached; it exists only as an ideal to which 
we can approximate but never fully attain. Bien also points to a possible monistic reading
o f the ending o f The Saviors o f God. He speculates, for instance, that the ending, when seen 
from a Buddhist frame, only means to deny separateness and to affirm the essential unity of 
everything. To illustrate, Bien quotes from the Zen master, Nyogen Senzaki:
So you see, the worlds o f desire, o f the material and o f the nonmaterial are one. This sameness 
is absolute and infinite.
To avoid the possibility o f misunderstanding, however, we speak o f this sameness negatively, 
calling it “Nothingness” or “Nirvana." (Quoted in Bien 1989:135; emphasis added by Bien)
30 Apart from general remarks regarding idealism and monism, I will not have anything more 
specific to say about the connections between Kazantzakis’s work and Hindu philosophy, 
though this is an area that deserves greater attention from scholars. Consider, for instance, 
Middleton’s comment: “Studying at the Kazantzakis library, based at the Historical Museum 
o f Iraklion, Crete, I discovered that Kazantzakis read and admired many books on Indian 
philosophy” (2007:118n9).
31 Later, in the same work (1973:364), Kazantzakis places Buddha at the summit o f the ascent.
32 Another worthwhile study is Charalampos-Demetres Gounelas’s “The Concept o f 
Resemblance in Kazantzakis’s Tragedies Christ and Buddha” (1998:313-330), which analyzes 
the role o f ‘resemblance’ in these works, with the aim o f showing that they are imbued with 
an idealist and monist strain o f thought.
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33 However, the technique of creating a play within a play so as to highlight the mind- 
dependence of reality and value is not entirely original to the Buddha play. As Gounelas has 
observed (1998), a similar strategy is evident in Kazantzakis’s other works, including Serpent 
and Lily (1906, his first literary work), Comedy: A Tragedy in One Act (published around 1909), 
the play Christ (published in 1928), and the novel Toda Raha (1929), in all of which the 
narrative and dialogue are enacted entirely within (an individual or indeterminate) mind or 
consciousness.
34 This recurs in the following two Acts, as soon as the Magician puts on the yellow mask (see 
Kazantzakis 1983:104,143).
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